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Abstract
This paper presents the Global Preference Survey, a globally representa-
tive dataset on risk and time preferences, positive and negative reciprocity,
altruism, and trust. We collected these preference data as well as a rich set
of covariates for 80,000 individuals, drawn as representative samples from 76
countries around the world, representing 90 percent of both the world’s popula-
tion and global income. The global distribution of preferences exhibits substan-
tial variation across countries, which is partly systematic: certain preferences
appear in combination, and follow distinct economic, institutional, and geo-
graphic patterns. The heterogeneity in preferences across individuals is even
more pronounced and varies systematically with age, gender, and cognitive
ability. Around the world, our preference measures are predictive of a wide
range of individual-level behaviors including savings and schooling decisions,
labor market and health choices, prosocial behaviors, and family structure. We
also shed light on the cultural origins of preference variation around the globe
using data on language structure.
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1 Introduction
This paper presents the Global Preference Survey (GPS), a novel and unique globally
representative dataset. The data include measures of risk preference, time prefer-
ence, positive and negative reciprocity, altruism, and trust that we collected for
80,000 individuals, drawn as representative samples in each of 76 countries. The
coverage of countries spans all continents, a broad set of cultures, a wide range of
development levels, and represents about 90 percent of both the world’s popula-
tion and global income, making the data also representative across countries. The
underlying survey measures were selected and tested through a rigorous ex ante ex-
perimental validation procedure involving real monetary stakes, so that the survey
items have a demonstrated ability to capture actual heterogeneity in state-of-the-art
experiments with financial incentives (Falk et al., 2015). To ensure comparability of
preference measures across countries, the elicitation followed a standardized protocol
that was implemented through the professional infrastructure of the Gallup World
Poll. Monetary stakes related to the elicitation involved comparable values in terms
of purchasing power across countries, and the survey items were culturally neutral
and translated using state-of-the-art procedures. In addition, pre-tests in 22 coun-
tries of various cultural heritage revealed the broad applicability of our survey items.
In consequence, the resulting dataset provides an ideal basis for the first systematic
investigation of the distribution, determinants, and predictive power of preferences
around the world.
Using these data, we provide evidence for several novel findings, both at the
country and at the individual level. First, for each of the six traits, we document a
substantial variation not just across individuals, but also across entire countries. Sec-
ond, we show that this cross-country heterogeneity is at least partly systematic and
follows pronounced economic, geographic and cultural patterns. All preferences are
significantly associated with important country-level variables including per capita
income, democracy, inequality, redistributive policies, religion, and geographic or cli-
matic variables. Third, the various preference measures are correlated, giving rise to
distinct “preference profiles” of groups of countries. Fourth, in spite of the substantial
between-country variation, most of the total individual-level variation in all prefer-
ences is due to within-country heterogeneity. Fifth, investigating the structure of
this individual-level variation, we find that in the world population as a whole, all of
the preferences are systematically related to individual characteristics. For instance,
women tend to be less patient and more risk averse, and exhibit stronger social pre-
dispositions, than men. Patience is hump-shaped in age, while risk taking as well
as positive and negative reciprocity are lower for older people. Self-reported cogni-
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tive skills positively correlate with patience, risk taking, and all social preferences.
Sixth, we provide evidence of heterogeneity across countries underlying the strong
average patterns of the individual-level correlates of preferences in the world popu-
lation as a whole. We show that while some relationships between preferences and
sociodemographics (such as between risk aversion and gender) are common to almost
all cultures, others appear more culturally or institutionally specific. For example,
patience and positive reciprocity exhibit a hump-shaped relationship with age in de-
veloped countries that is almost entirely absent in developing nations. Seventh, we
show that individual-level preferences are also significantly correlated with household
income, subjective perceptions of safety and health, as well as religious affiliation.
Eighth, we examine the predictive power of preference heterogeneity for economic
behaviors. Around the world, patient individuals are more likely to save and have
higher educational attainment; more risk tolerant individuals are more likely to be-
come self-employed and to be smokers; and social preferences are highly predictive
of a broad range of prosocial behaviors and outcomes such as donating, volunteering
time, assisting strangers, helping friends and relatives, or family structure. Finally,
we shed light on the cultural origins of the global preference variation by making use
of information on language structure: people who speak languages that do not re-
quire an explit coding of the future are more patient, positively reciprocal, trusting,
and altruistic, both across and within countries.
Our analysis provides the first systematic assessment of the nature and explana-
tory power of preference heterogeneity around the world. The underlying data are,
however, well-suited for a much broader research agenda on the determinants and
implications of certain preference profiles. Going forward, the data lend themselves
to investigations both at the micro- and the macro-level. At the micro level, several
studies have examined individual-level preference heterogeneity and the correspond-
ing correlates, like gender, in specific samples and cultures (see, e.g., Barsky et al.,
1997; Frederick, 2005; Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Dohmen et al., 2008, 2010, 2011).
However, the previous lack of data has prevented systematic investigations of the
cultural specificity of such findings, an issue that is relevant for understanding the
cultural or biological mechanisms through which individual characteristics like age
or gender might shape preferences. Our results highlight some cases in which gen-
eralizing beyond single countries can be particularly misleading, because it ignores
the country and population specificity of such effects. At the same time, the data
show how some relationships are close to universal. Likewise, while previous work
has provided evidence that preferences are predictive of important economic deci-
sions, it has been an open question whether preferences are uniformly predictive of
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behaviors across cultures and institutional backgrounds, and to which extent they
shape heterogeneity in life outcomes.1
The GPS data may also prove valuable for research in cultural economics and
political economy (Guiso et al., 2006; Fernández, 2011; Alesina and Giuliano, forth-
coming; Giuliano and Nunn, 2013). To date, empirical research into the roots of
cross-country variation in preferences has been impeded by a lack of appropriate mea-
sures and representative sampling; contributions on the cross-country heterogeneity
in preferences have typically made use of small and non-representative samples in
a limited set of countries (Roth et al., 1991; Henrich et al., 2001; Herrmann et al.,
2008). Accordingly, researchers interested in the determinants and implications of
cultural variation have considered variables such as female labor force participation,
fertility, individualism, and future-orientation (Giuliano, 2007; Fernández and Fogli,
2009; Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2011; Alesina et al., 2013; Chen, 2013; Alesina et
al., forthcoming; Galor and Özak, 2014), but have not studied the preference compo-
nent of culture. The data of the GPS, which feature 80,000 individuals from various
cultural backgrounds, are likely to produce new insights in this direction.
Apart from such micro-level analyses, the representative cross-country nature of
our data also permits an investigation of the relationships of preferences to aggregate
economic and social outcomes across countries, which to date is uncharted territory.2
Motivated by the strong and systematic correlations reported in this paper, the
preference data may be used both in an attempt to explain cross-country differences
in aggregate outcomes, and in controlling for preference differences when interest lies
in identifying other relationships.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we present
the Global Preference Survey dataset. In Section 3, we describe the nature of cross-
country variation in preferences. Section 4 studies the relationship between pref-
erences and individual characteristics, while Section 5 investigates the relationships
between preferences and behaviors. In Section 6, we analyze the relationship between
preferences and language structure. Section 7 concludes.
1Time preference correlates with outcomes ranging from savings to Body Mass Index (Ventura,
2003; Kirby and Petry, 2004; Borghans and Golsteyn, 2006; Eckel et al., 2005; Chabris et al.,
2008; Tanaka et al., 2010; Meier and Sprenger, 2010; Sutter et al., 2013; Golsteyn et al., 2014).
Risk preferences are related to various risky decisions, including being self-employed, migrating,
and holding risky assets (See, e.g., Barsky et al., 1997; Bonin et al., 2007; Guiso and Paiella, 2008;
Dohmen et al., 2011). Social preferences are correlated with cooperative behaviors in various aspects
of life including in the workplace (Dohmen et al., 2009; Rustagi et al., 2010; Carpenter and Seki,
2011; Kosfeld and Rustagi, 2015).
2An exception is the burgeneoing literature on the importance of trust, see, e.g., Knack and
Keefer (1997); Guiso et al. (2009); Algan and Cahuc (2010).
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2 Dataset
2.1 General Data Characteristics
The Global Preference Survey (GPS) is a new globally representative survey de-
signed to measure respondents’ time preferences, risk preferences, social preferences,
and trust. The GPS data were collected within the framework of the Gallup World
Poll, which surveys representative population samples in a large number of coun-
tries about social and economic issues on an annual basis. In 2012, we added the
GPS to the World Poll’s questionnaire in 76 countries, so that the survey items were
fielded through the existing professional infrastructure of one of the world’s lead-
ing global survey companies. Four noteworthy features characterize the preference
data: (i) representative population samples within each country, (ii) geographical
and economic representativeness in terms of countries covered, (iii) a rigorous exper-
imental validation and selection procedure of the underlying survey items, and (iv) a
standardized data collection protocol across countries. We discuss these features in
the following; in addition, Appendix A contains an extensive documentation of the
data-collection process as well as additional details on the survey measures.
First, we measure preferences in large representative population samples in each
country.3 The median sample size was 1,000 participants per country, in 76 countries
all over the world.4 In total, we collected preference measures for more than 80,000
participants worldwide. Respondents were selected through probability sampling;
ex-post representativeness of the data can be achieved using weights provided by
Gallup.5 In sum, our data allow for valid inferences about the distribution of pref-
erences in each country as well as about between-country differences in preferences.
Second, the data are characterized by geographical representativeness in terms of
the countries being covered. The sample of 76 countries is not restricted to Western
industrialized nations, but covers all continents, various cultures, and different levels
of development. Specifically, our sample includes 15 countries from the Americas,
25 from Europe, 22 from Asia and Pacific, as well as 14 African countries, 11 of
which are Sub-Saharan. This set of countries covers about 90% of both the world
population and global income.
Third, we designed, tested, and selected the survey items of the GPS using a rig-
3Data sets that contain preference measures for several countries typically come from small- or
medium-scale surveys or experiments and are based on student or other convenience samples (e.g.,
Wang et al. (2011), Rieger et al. (forthcoming), Vieider et al. (2015), Vieider et al. (2014).
4Notable exceptions include China (2,574 obs.), Haiti (504 obs.), India (2,539 obs.), Iran (2,507
obs.), Russia (1,498 obs.), and Suriname (504 obs.).
5These weights are constructed to render the observations representative in terms of age, gender,
income, education, and geographic location.
4
orous ex-ante experimental validation and selection procedure (for details see Falk
et al., 2015). While items in international surveys are frequently designed based on
introspective arguments of plausibility or relevance, our items are the result of an
explicit formal selection procedure, which also ensures that the resulting measures
are predictive of actual preferences as measured through state-of-the-art experiments.
Arguably, such an ex-ante validation of survey items constitutes a significant method-
ological advance over the ad-hoc selection of questions for surveys. As detailed in
Falk et al. (2015), in the validation procedure, experimental subjects completed
incentivized choice experiments to measure their preference parameters, and also
answered a large battery of candidate survey questions. For each preference, those
survey items that jointly perform best in predicting the financially incentivized be-
havior were selected to form the preference survey module.6 Thus, the module does
not only consist of survey questions that predict behavior, but is composed of the
best behavioral predictors out of a large set of candidate measures.
In a next step, the GPS was developed for implementation in the Gallup World
Poll. To this end, Gallup conducted pre-tests in 22 countries of various cultural her-
itage, in order to ensure the implementability of the module in the available survey
time of 7 to 8 minutes, and to test whether respondents of culturally and economi-
cally heterogeneous background understand and interpret the items adequately (see
Appendix A.3 for details). Other measures taken to ensure that the survey items
were comparable across cultures included: (i) translation of all items back and forth
in an iterative process using Gallup’s regular translation scheme, and (ii) calibration
of monetary values used in the survey questions according to median household in-
come for each country.7 Finally, the interviews for the World Poll 2012 took place
face-to-face or via telephone by professional interviewers. Thus, the survey items
were fielded in a comparable way using a standardized procedure across countries.
6We excluded quantitative measures that require long and complex instructions, or which had
shorter alternative quantitative measures that were close substitutes, from the set of candidate
measures before the item selection procedure was conducted.
7As a benchmark, we used the monetary amounts in Euro that were offered in the validation
study in Germany. Since monetary amounts used in the validation study with the German sample
were round numbers to facilitate easy calculations (e.g., the expected return of a lottery with equal
chances of winning and losing) and to allow for easy comparisons (e.g., 100 Euro today versus
107.50 in 12 months), we also rounded monetary amounts in all other countries to the next “round”
number. While this necessarily resulted in some (very minor) variations in the real stake size
between countries, it minimized cross-country differences in the understanding the quantitative
items due to difficulties in assessing the involved monetary amounts.
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2.2 Preference Measures
For each preference, we obtain a final individual-level measure by weighing responses
to multiple survey items using the weights obtained from the experimental validation
procedure. These weights are based on an OLS regression of observed behavior in
the financially incentivized experiments on the respective survey measures (see Falk
et al., 2015, for details). We first standardize individual-level responses to all items
(i.e., compute z-scores) and then weigh these standardized responses using the OLS
weights to derive the best predictor of observed experimental behavior. Finally, for
ease of interpretation, each preference measure is again standardized at the individual
level, so that, by construction, each preference has a mean of zero and a standard
deviation of one in the individual-level world sample.
The GPS contains twelve items which are summarized in Table 1. For most pref-
erences, the set of questions consists of a combination of qualitative items, which are
more abstract, and quantitative questions, which put the respondent into precisely
defined hypothetical choice scenarios.8
Patience. Our measure of patience is derived from the combination of responses to
two survey measures, one with a quantitative and one with a qualitative format. The
quantitative survey measure consists of a series of five interdependent hypothetical
binary choices between immediate and delayed financial rewards, a format commonly
referred to as “staircase” (or “unfolding brackets”) procedure (Cornsweet, 1962). In
each of the five questions, participants had to decide between receiving a payment
Table 1: Survey items of the GPS
Preference Item Description Weight
Patience Intertemporal choice sequence using staircase method 0.71Self-assessment: Willingness to wait 0.29
Risk taking Lottery choice sequence using staircase method 0.47Self-assessment: Willingness to take risks in general 0.53
Positive Self-assessment: Willingness to return a favor 0.48
reciprocity Gift in exchange for help 0.52
Negative Self-assessment: Willingness to take revenge 0.37
reciprocity Self-assessment: Willingness to punish unfair behavior towards self 0.265
Self-assessment: Willingness to punish unfair behavior towards others 0.265
Altruism Donation decision 0.54Self-assessment: Willingness to give to good causes 0.46
Trust Self-assessment: People have only the best intentions 1
Notes. See Appendix A.6 for the wording of the questions and Appendix A.7.2 for a discussion of
the weights.
8Under certain assumptions, the quantitative items allow the computation of quantitative mea-
sures such as a CRRA coefficient or an internal rate of return.
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today or larger payments in 12 months:
Suppose you were given the choice between receiving a payment today or
a payment in 12 months. We will now present to you five situations. The
payment today is the same in each of these situations. The payment in
12 months is different in every situation. For each of these situations
we would like to know which one you would choose. Please assume there
is no inflation, i.e., future prices are the same as today’s prices. Please
consider the following: Would you rather receive amount x today or y in
12 months?
The immediate payment x remained constant in all subsequent four questions,
but the delayed payment y was increased or decreased depending on previous choices
(see Appendix A.6.1 for an exposition of the entire sequence of binary decisions). In
essence, by adjusting the delayed payment according to previous choices, the ques-
tions “zoom in” around the respondent’s point of indifference between the smaller
immediate and the larger delayed payment and make efficient use of limited and
costly survey time. The sequence of questions has 32 possible ordered outcomes. In
the international survey, monetary amounts x and y were expressed in the respec-
tive local currency, scaled relative to median household income in the given country.
Notably, this measure not only resembles standard experimental procedures of elic-
iting time preferences, but it is also precisely defined, arguably making it less prone
to culture-dependent interpretations. This makes the quantitative patience measure
well-suited for a multinational study like the present one.
The qualitative measure of patience is given by the respondents’ self-assessment
regarding their willingness to wait on an 11-point Likert scale, asking “how willing
are you to give up something that is beneficial for you today in order to benefit more
from that in the future?” As discussed above, the two items were first standardized
and then combined linearly to form the final measure of patience, which was then
standardized again at the individual level in the world sample. The quantitative
measure obtained a weight of 71%.
Risk Taking. Risk preferences were also elicited through a series of related quan-
titative questions as well as one qualitative question. Just as with patience, the
quantitative measure consists of a series of five binary choices between a fixed lottery
and varying sure payments, hence making use of the advantages of precisely defined,
quantitative survey items in culturally and economically heterogeneous samples:
Please imagine the following situation. You can choose between a sure
payment of a particular amount of money, or a draw, where you would
7
have an equal chance of getting amount x or getting nothing. We will
present to you five different situations. What would you prefer: a draw
with a 50 percent chance of receiving amount x, and the same 50 percent
chance of receiving nothing, or the amount of y as a sure payment?
The questions are again interdependent in the sense that the choice of the lottery
results in an increase of the sure amount being offered in the next question, and vice
versa. Appendix A.6.2 contains an exposition of the entire sequence of survey items.
The qualitative item asks for the respondents’ self-assessment of their willingness to
take risks on an eleven-point scale (“In general, how willing are you to take risks?”).
This qualitative subjective self-assessment has previously been shown to be predictive
of risk-taking behavior in the field in a representative sample (Dohmen et al., 2011) as
well as of incentivized experimental risk-taking across countries in student samples
(Vieider et al., 2014). The qualitative item and the outcome of the quantitative
staircase measure were combined through roughly equal weights.
Positive Reciprocity. People’s propensity to act in a positively reciprocal way
was also measured using one qualitative item and one question with a quantitative
component. First, respondents were asked to provide a self-assessment about how
willing they are to return a favor on an 11-point Likert scale. Second, participants
were presented a choice scenario in which they were asked to imagine that they got
lost in an unfamiliar area and that a stranger – when asked for directions – offered
to take them to their destination. Participants were then asked which out of six
presents (worth between 5 and 30 euros in 5 euros intervals) they would give to the
stranger as a “thank you”. These two items receive roughly equal weights.
Negative Reciprocity. Negative reciprocity was elicited through three self-assess-
ments. First, people were asked how willing they are to take revenge if they are
treated very unjustly, even if doing so comes at a cost (0-10). The second and third
item probed respondents about their willingness to punish someone for unfair be-
havior, either towards themselves or towards a third person.9 This last item captures
prosocial punishment and hence a concept akin to norm enforcement. These three
items receive weights of about one third each.
9In the original validation study, the second and third item were collapsed into one question
which asked people how willing they are to punish others, without specifying who was treated
unfairly (Falk et al., 2015). However, in the cross-country pre-test, a number of respondents in-
dicated that this lack of specificity confused them, so that we broke this survey item up into two
questions. Accordingly, the weights for deriving an individual-level index of negative reciprocity
are determined by dividing the OLS weight for the original item by two.
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Altruism. Altruism was measured through a combination of one qualitative and
one quantitative item, both of which are related to donation. The qualitative ques-
tion asked people how willing they would be to give to good causes without expecting
anything in return on an 11-point scale. The quantitative scenario depicted a situa-
tion in which the respondent unexpectedly received 1,000 euros and asked them to
state how much of this amount they would donate. These two items were weighted
about equally.
Trust. To measure trust, we used one item, which asked people whether they
assume that other people only have the best intentions (Likert scale, 0-10).10
2.3 Further Variables of Interest
The GPS data include a wide range of individual-level background variables which
can be linked to the preference measures. These background variables include the
core items of the Gallup World Poll such as (i) extensive sociodemographic infor-
mation (e.g., age, gender, family structure, country of birth, religious affiliation,
location of residence, or migration background including country of origin), (ii) a
variety of self-reported behaviors and economic outcome variables including income,
educational attainment, savings, labor market decisions, health, and behavior in so-
cial interactions, and (iii) opinions and attitudes about issues such as local and global
politics, local institutional quality, economic prospects, safety, or happiness. We also
elicited a self-reported proxy for cognitive skills by asking people to assess themselves
regarding the statement “I am good at math” on an 11-point Likert scale. Finally,
the data contain regional identifiers (usually at the state or province level), hence
allowing for cross-regional analyses within countries.
3 Cross-Country Analysis
The analysis begins with an investigation of the heterogeneity of preferences around
the world. Figure 1 shows how the country averages for each (standardized) prefer-
ence compare to the world average. The figure reveals that preferences vary substan-
tially across countries, by at least one standard deviation for each preference (see
figure notes on color coding).11 Most country differences displayed in Figure 1 are sta-
tistically significant. Calculating t-tests of all possible (2,850) pairwise comparisons
10Given the existence of the World Values Survey data, we can perform a first plausibility check
on our data by showing that our trust measure is correlated with the WVS data (ρ = 0.53, p < 0.01).
11Appendix A.8 provide an alternative way to visualize the heterogeneity, with histograms of
preferences at the country and individual levels.
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Patience Risk taking
Positive reciprocity Negative reciprocity
Altruism Trust
Figure 1: World maps of preferences. In each figure, white denotes the world average. Darker blue
indicates higher values of a given trait, while darker red colors indicate lower values, all of which
are measured in standard deviations from the world mean. Grey indicates missings.
for each preference, the fraction of significant (1-percent level) country differences
are: 78% for risk, 83% for patience, 80% for altruism, 81% for positive reciprocity,
79% for negative reciprocity, and 78% for trust, respectively.
To provide a complementary perspective on the geographic and cultural vari-
ation in aggregate preferences, Figures 9a and 9b in Appendix C group countries
into six world regions: Western and “Neo” Europe (i.e., the US, Canada, and Aus-
tralia), Former Communist Eastern Europe, Asia, North Africa and Middle East,
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Sub-Saharan Africa, and Southern America. For each region, we present two scatter
plots which illustrate the distribution of patience, risk taking, negative reciprocity,
and “prosociality”12 within each region, relative to the world mean of the respective
preference. Populations in Western and “Neo” Europe tend to be substantially more
patient than the world mean. In fact, all of the ten most patient countries in the
world are either located in Western Europe or part of the English-speaking world,
with the Northern European countries exhibiting particularly high levels of patience.
Western European countries are also notable for negative reciprocity; eight out of
the ten most negatively reciprocal countries are located in Europe. Three of the five
most negatively reciprocal countries in our sample – Turkey, Greece, and South Ko-
rea – have been found in previous research (Herrmann et al., 2008) to be particularly
prone to retaliatory (anti-social) punishments in incentivized social dilemma games.
To the East, the former communist Eastern European countries are on average
rather risk averse and not very patient, but the patterns are less clear compared to
their Western European counterparts. Similar patterns obtain for East and South
Asia, where most populations except the Confucian ones (China, Japan, South Ko-
rea) are relatively impatient.
Middle Eastern and North African populations have in common relatively high
levels of risk tolerance and low levels of patience. Prosociality and negative reci-
procity of this group of countries are fairly diverse. Notably, all of the ten most risk
tolerant countries in our sample are located in the Middle East or Africa; in addition,
all sub-Saharan populations are on average less prosocial than the world mean and
are rather impatient.
Finally, in the Southern Americas, most populations appear impatient. They
also have low levels of negative reciprocity and intermediate values in risk taking
and prosociality. In sum, these results highlight that different types of preferences
are spatially and culturally concentrated.
To begin to open the black box of cross-country variation in preferences, we pro-
ceed by relating preferences to country-level characteristics. In a first step, we seek
to understand which fraction of the between-country variation can be explained by
commonly employed variables that are plausibly exogenous to preferences. To this
end, Figure 2 plots the R-squared of OLS regressions of each preference on a set of
variables which proxy for geography, climate, diversity, and religion. Geography in-
cludes distance to the equator, longitude, and the fraction of the population at risk of
contracting malaria; climate includes average precipitation and average temperature
12Given the high correlations between altruism, positive reciprocity, and trust (see below), we
define prosociality as the unweighted average of these three measures. Very similar results obtain
if we run a factor analysis and use the first factor of the three measures.
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Figure 2: Cross-country variance explained. The figures plot the R2 of an OLS regression of the
respective preference on absolute latitude, longitude, and the fraction of the population at risk of
contracting malaria (geography), average temperature, average precipitation and the fraction of
the population living in the (sub)-tropics (climate), religious and ethnic fractionalization as well
as linguistic diversity (diversity), and the share of protestants, catholics, muslims, jews, hinduists,
and buddhists (religion), as well as all of these variables. All figures contain 73 countries. See
Appendix D for the regression coefficients and Appendix I for details on all covariates.
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as well as the fraction of the population living in the (sub)-tropics; diversity includes
ethnic and religious fractionalization as well as linguistic diversity (Fearon, 2003);
and religion includes the share of the population adhering to catholic, protestant,
muslim, buddhist, hinduist, or jewish beliefs.
As Figure 2 shows, the variance explained by categories differs, and it differs
by preference. For example, geography explains 20% of the variation in patience,
but is largely unrelated to risk. Climate, by contrast, is strongly related to both
preferences. The diversity indices explain more than a quarter of the varience in
patience, but virtually no variation in altruism or positive reciprocity. Religion
shares explain a considerable fraction of the variation in patience and trust, but
little of the other social preferences. All variables in combination can account for
between 26% and 53% of the between-country variation in preferences, with patience
generally exhibiting the highest share of variance explained. Appendix D presents
the regression coefficients underlying each figure.
In a next step, we study the correlations between preferences and country-level
outcomes or characteristics which may be endogenous to preferences. Table 2 presents
Pearson correlations between all preferences and a set of economic, political, and
health variables.13 Overall, the country-level preference measures vary systemati-
cally with important aggregate economic and social outcomes. In particular, we find
that a population’s average patience is strongly correlated with the degree of eco-
nomic and institutional development, as exemplified by high income per capita, a
high democracy index, and high average life expectancy at birth. Average risk taking
exhibits significant correlations with a set of variables which are connected to the
“riskiness” of the respective economic, social, and health environment. Risk tolerant
populations are those with low life expectancy, high economic inequality, low redis-
tribution, low labor protection, and more intentional homicides. Thus, overall, risk
averse populations seem to be more protected and have stronger social safety nets,
consistent with the view that the riskiness of the overall environment is influenced
by, or influences, people’s risk attitudes.
Regarding social preferences, positive reciprocity tends to be higher in environ-
ments with high life expectancy and in countries with low crime. Populations with
strong negatively reciprocal inclinations are richer, have lower inequality, redistribute
more, and exhibit lower numbers of homicides. Finally, trust is positively correlated
with national income, but not with democracy. Higher inequality and a higher
homicide rate are associated with lower trust. These intriguing correlations raise
the question of whether preferences might shape, be shaped by, or co-evolve with
13Computing Spearman rank correlations yields very similar results.
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cross-country variation in development, inequality, or institutions, pointing towards
an important direction for future research.
While various preferences exhibit economic and geographic patterns, preferences
may also be correlated amongst each other, giving rise to country-level preference
profiles. To investigate the relationship among different preferences, Table 3 shows
Pearson correlations of preferences together with levels of significance.14 The sig-
nificant correlations indicate that preferences are not distributed independently of
one another. One set of traits that goes together is risk tolerance and patience, as
shown by the positive and statistically significant correlation at the country level.
This is in spite of the special case of Sub-Saharan African countries, which tend to
be risk seeking and impatient, as discussed above.15 Another grouping of positively
correlated traits involves prosociality, i.e., the traits of positive reciprocity, altruism
and trust. While trust constitutes a belief rather than a preference, all of these traits
share in common that they describe positive behavioral dispositions towards others.
The correlation between altruism and positive reciprocity is particularly high, and
trust also tends to be higher where people are positively reciprocal. This is intuitive
as it is hard to imagine stable and high levels of trust in environments absent posi-
tive reciprocity, i.e., trust rewarding behaviors.16 Despite being related to the social
domain, negative reciprocity is not at all correlated with prosociality. We report the
correlation structure among preferences at the individual level in Appendix B.
Evidence that preference dispositions vary substantially across countries does not
imply that cross-country or cultural differences are the primary source of preference
Table 3: Pairwise correlations between preferences at country level
Patience Risk taking Pos. reciprocity Neg. reciprocity Altruism Trust
Patience 1
Risk taking 0.231∗∗ 1
Positive reciprocity 0.0202 -0.256∗∗ 1
Negative reciprocity 0.262∗∗ 0.193∗ -0.154 1
Altruism -0.00691 -0.0155 0.711∗∗∗ -0.132 1
Trust 0.186 -0.0613 0.363∗∗∗ 0.160 0.272∗∗ 1
Notes. Pairwise Pearson correlations between average preferences at country level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
14The results are similar when computing Spearman correlations.
15Excluding African countries, the positive correlation between risk taking and patience increases
to 0.30, while other correlations remain largely the same. The correlation between the staircase
risk and patience items is 0.19, while that between the two qualitative risk and patience items is
0.55.
16Given that our survey item for trust measures only the belief-component of trust (as opposed
to first-mover behavior in trust games, which is also affected by risk preferences), the low correlation
between trust and risk taking is consistent with previous within-country findings.
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variation in the world. Table 4 shows results from a total variance decomposition,
which reveals that the within-country variation in preferences is actually larger than
the between-country variation, an observation that varies only minimally by pref-
erence. Part of the within-country variation might reflect measurement error, so
that the variation in true preferences is overstated.17 However, the available evi-
dence on the size of test-retest correlations and measurement error suggests that it is
highly unlikely that measurement error alone produces the fact that within-country
variation dominates between-country variation, see Appendix H for details.
The relative importance of within-country variation does not imply that coun-
try differences are negligible or irrelevant. It does, however, suggest that individual
characteristics contribute relatively more to the formation of human preferences than
national borders.
Table 4: Between- vs. within-country variation
Preference Between-country Within-countryvariation (%) variation (%)
Patience 13.5 86.5
Risk taking 9.0 91.0
Positive reciprocity 12.0 88.0
Negative reciprocity 7.0 93.0
Altruism 12.3 87.7
Trust 8.2 91.8
Notes. Results from a variance decomposition in which the total
individual-level variation in the respective preference is decom-
posed into the variance of the average preference across countries
and the average of the within-country variance. Formally, the
between-country variation corresponds to the R2 of an OLS
regression of all individual-level observations on a set of country
dummies in which all observations are weighted by the sampling
weights provided by Gallup to achieve (ex post) representativeness.
17In fact, comparing the between- and within-country variation across survey items reveals that
the between-country variation tends to be relatively larger for the quantitative survey items. For
example, in the case of patience, the quantitative staircase procedure exhibits a between-country
variation of 15.7%, while the qualitative patience measure has a between-country variation of 7.3%.
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4 Preferences and Individual Characteristics
4.1 Age, Gender, and Cognitive Ability
The pronounced within-country heterogeneity calls for a better understanding of
the individual-level determinants of preferences. The analysis focuses on three main
characteristics: age, gender and cognitive ability, taking self-reported math skills as a
proxy for the latter.18 Gender, age, and cognitive ability are interesting to study, and
have received particular attention in previous research on preferences (e.g., Barsky
et al., 1997; Donkers et al., 2001; Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Frederick, 2005; Sutter
and Kocher, 2007; Dohmen et al., 2010, 2011; Benjamin et al., 2013), for two main
reasons. First, they are associated with important differences in economic outcomes.
If preferences vary with these traits, they could be part of the explanation. Second,
these traits are plausibly exogenous to preferences. The previous literature has pro-
posed various mechanisms through which gender, age, and cognitive ability might be
related to preferences, ranging from biological to purely social (Croson and Gneezy,
2009; Dohmen et al., 2011; Benjamin et al., 2013). There is limited knowledge,
however, about the relative importance of these different types of mechanisms. For
example, alternative explanations for age effects include an influence of idiosyncratic
historical and cultural environments on the one hand, to biological aspects of the
aging process on the other hand. The ability to examine how different preferences
vary with characteristics across countries with diverse historical experiences can shed
light on such questions.
Table 5 reports regressions of each preference on age, age squared, gender and
math skills in the full world sample, conditional on country fixed effects. For each
preference, the second column contains additional covariates to be discussed below.
The variables are standardized, so the coefficients show the change in the dependent
variable (respective preference) in standard deviation units, for a one unit change in
an independent variable (individual characteristics).
The estimates in table 5 reveal that, in the world population as a whole, pref-
erences vary significantly with gender, age, and cognitive ability. Specifically, for
gender, the strongest relationship is for risk preference: women are relatively more
risk averse than men. Women are also significantly more prosocial, i.e., they tend
to be more altruistic, positively reciprocal, and trusting, and are less negatively
reciprocal. Women are slightly more impatient than men. In terms of age, the
18This proxy may tend to capture the numeracy aspect of cognitive skills. Subjective assessments
of ability are correlated with measured cognitive ability, and have predictive power for academic
achievement (Spinath et al., 2006). While such relative self-assessment might be interpreted in
different ways across countries, we only use self-reported cognitive skills in within-country analyses.
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regression results indicate that, on average: Young individuals are relatively more
willing to take risks, and punish; the middle aged are especially positively reciprocal
and patient; the elderly have the strongest risk aversion and are relatively trust-
ing. Preferences are also significantly related to self-reported cognitive ability: high
cognitive ability individuals are more patient, less risk averse, more positively and
negatively reciprocal, more trusting, and more altruistic.
We next exploit the ability to study the relationship of preferences to character-
istics separately, for 76 different countries, to understand the extent to which the
relationship of preferences to characteristics is culturally specific. Figure 3 addresses
this question for gender differences. For each country, we regress each preference on
age, age squared, gender, and cognitive ability. Figure 3 plots the resulting (condi-
tional) gender coefficients. Each dot represents a country, the respective coefficient
and the respective level of significance (green not significantly different from zero,
pink at 10, blue at 5, and red at 1 percent level of significance, respectively). To ease
reading, each panel also contains a horizontal line at zero.
Figure 3 shows that greater risk aversion among women is common to most coun-
tries. In 95 percent of countries, the gender coefficient is non-zero and in the direction
of greater risk aversion among women. Of these negative coefficients, 82 percent are
statistically significant at least at the 10-percent level. The gender difference in neg-
ative reciprocity is next in terms of universality: in 89 percent of countries is the
female population on average less willing to reciprocate negatively than men. The
impression that the majority of countries have a similar qualitative relationship be-
tween gender and preferences extends to the other social preferences, although there
is more heterogeneity. For altruism, positive reciprocity, and trust about 79 percent,
71 percent, and 71 percent of countries have women being more pro-social than men,
respectively. Patience is the most variable in terms of gender differences, but still,
68 percent of countries have non-zero coefficients of the same sign. These findings
show that there are striking commonalities in terms of how gender and preferences
are related, across a large and diverse set of cultural backgrounds. At the same
time, there is substantial heterogeneity in the magnitude of the relationships across
countries.
Figure 4 explores how the relationship between age and preferences varies across
countries. This figure is divided by whether countries are OECD-members or not,
in order to show some of the most salient cross-country differences: OECD-members
exhibit a hump-shaped pattern for both positive reciprocity and patience, that is
almost entirely absent in non-OECD countries. In Appendix E.1, we also provide
the age profiles for the six world regions defined above, i.e., Western and “Neo”
19
Figure 3: Gender correlations separately by country. Each panel plots the distribution of gender
correlations. That is, for each country, we regress the respective preference on gender, age and
its square, and subjective math skills, and plot the resulting gender coefficients as well as their
significance level. In order to make countries comparable, each preference was standardized (z-
scores) within each country before computing the coefficients. Green dots indicate countries in
which the gender correlation is not statistically different from zero at the 10% level, while red /
blue / pink dots denote countries in which the effect is significant at the 1% / 5% / 10% level,
respectively. Positive coefficients imply that women have higher values in the respective preference.
20
Europe, Former Communist Eastern Europe, Asia, North Africa and Middle East,
Sub-Saharan Africa, and Southern America. These figures show that patience and
positive reciprocity have hump-shaped age profiles mainly in Western and Neo Eu-
rope, but also reveal that age profiles for altruism are variable across world regions.
By contrast, the age profiles for risk taking, negative reciprocity, and trust are more
universal.19
Intuitively, the relationship between cognitive ability and preferences might not
be as strongly tied to socially constructed roles as gender, or age, and might hence
have an even more universal relationship to preferences independent of cultural back-
ground. Indeed, we find that self-reported cognitive ability is related to each pref-
erence in a strikingly similar way across countries. For every preference, at least 93
percent of countries have the same qualitative relationship between the preference
and cognitive ability, for all preferences. Similarly to Figure 3, Appendix E.2 shows
graphs of the cognitive ability coefficients, by preference and country.
In sum, the findings reveal that there are at least some mechanisms linking pref-
erences to gender, age, and cognitive ability that are universal features of humans,
possibly due to biological or psychological mechanisms. At the same time, the re-
sults also show a significant amount of variation in the quantitative magnitude and
sometimes even the direction of relationships with individual characteristics. Thus,
the results provide an important caveat to studies on more specific samples, which
sometimes produce highly variable or even contradictory results.
Figure 4: Age profiles by OECD membership. The figures depict the relationship between prefer-
ences and age conditional on country fixed effects, gender, and subjective math skills. These are
augmented component plus residuals plots, in which the vertical axis represents the component of
the preference that is predicted by age and its square plus the residuals from the regression in the
second column of Table 5. The horizontal axis represents age, winsorized at 83 (99th percentile).
19Similar results on the (partially non-linear) age profiles and their relationship to the degree of
development obtain when we depict the age profile for all 76 countries separately; these figures are
available upon request.
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4.2 Further Correlates of Preferences
The analysis proceeds by investigating the relationship between preferences on the
one hand and income, religious affiliation, physical health, and subjective safety
perceptions, on the other hand. While these characteristics and attitudes are not as
exogenous to preferences as age, gender, and cognitive ability, they might nevertheless
plausibly affect the formation of preferences.
Health and safety perceptions are evaluated using two indices that Gallup pro-
vides by aggregating several survey items. For example, the subjective law and order
index includes a question on whether respondents recently had money or property
stolen. The subjective health index makes use of an item asking people whether they
have health problems that are atypical given their age, among others (see Appendix I
for details).
The results are reported in columns (2), (4), (6), (8), (10), and (12) of Table 5.
The table shows that household income is positively correlated with all preferences,
but not with trust. Subjective perceptions of law and order are positively correlated
with patience and trust, and negatively associated to negative reciprocity. One
possible interpretation is that if people feel safe, they trust others more and are more
willing to postpone financial rewards. Negative reciprocity might be less prevalent
if an individual believes institutions already provide mechanisms for strong formal
sanctions. Previous work finds that retaliatory punishment is more pronounced in
countries where people perceive the rule of law as weak (Herrmann et al., 2008).
Subjective physical health perceptions are positively correlated with all traits,
except for negative reciprocity. Turning to religious affiliation, the regressions in-
vestigate the correlation between six religion dummies (christian, muslim, hinduist,
buddhist, jew, other), taking seculars as baseline category. Again note that the re-
ligious affiliation coefficients are entirely identified from within-country variation in
religious denomination and preferences. We find a very consistent pattern: relative
to seculars, christians, muslims, and hinduists are less patient, more risk averse, less
negatively reciprocal as well as more altristic and trusting. Similar patterns hold for
buddhists. Jews, on the other hand, are more patient, altruistic, and trusting, and
have strong negatively reciprocal inclinations. Overall, these results suggest that,
relative to atheists, being religious of any denomination tends to be associated with
relatively high risk aversion, high values on the prosocial dimensions altruism and
trust, and low negative reciprocity (albeit with a few notable exceptions).
22
5 Preferences and Individual Behaviors
We now turn to investigating the relationships of preferences to individual behaviors
and outcomes. Understanding the relationship between our preference measures and
individual-level economic and social decisions is important in two respects. First,
such analyses provide insights into the role of heterogeneity in underlying preference
parameters for generating observed choice behavior, on a global scale. Second, it
allows us to evaluate the meaningfulness and behavioral relevance of our items in a
culturally and economically highly heterogeneous sample.20
5.1 Accumulation Decisions
We evaluate the explanatory power of the GPS patience measure by relating it to
the accumulation of physical and human capital. Table 6 presents estimates of OLS
regressions of different outcomes on patience. Columns (1) and (2) display the re-
sults of a linear probability model, in which we employ as dependent variable a
binary indicator for whether the respondent saved in the previous year. Patience is
correlated with savings behavior both with and without country fixed effects, and
conditional on socioeconomic covariates such as age, gender, income, cognitive abil-
ity, and religion. The point estimate implies that a one standard deviation increase
in patience is associated with a roughly 20% increase of the probability of saving
relative to the baseline probability of 26.7%. Columns (3) and (4) establish that
patience is also significantly related to educational attainment; these estimates are
based on a three-step categorical variable (roughly: primary, seondary, and tertiary
education).21
In Appendix F.1, we show that the significant relationship between our patience
variable and accumulation processes is not driven by only a few countries. Specifi-
cally, by plotting the distribution of point estimates and their significance level across
countries, we show that the coefficient of patience is positive in the more than 90%
of countries for both savings and education, and mostly statistically significant. For
instance, the correlation between patience and education is in most cases statistically
significant at least at the 5% level in 74% of all countries.
20Throughout this section, the respective dependent variables are sometimes only available for
a subset of countries because the respective question was not part of Gallup’s core questionnaire.
21Appendix F.2 presents robustness checks on all results in this section using (ordered) probit
estimations.
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5.2 Risky Choices
To investigate whether risk preferences are related to important risky decisions in
life, we build on previous within-country findings, which have found a relationship
of risk attitudes to self-employment and health behavior (Dohmen et al., 2011). As
columns (5) and (6) of Table 6 establish, our preference measure predicts actual
self-employment both across and within countries. The same pattern holds when
considering individuals’ intention to start their own business, conditional on not
being self-employed (columns (7)-(8)).
Columns (9) and (10) relate risk preferences to the respondent’s smoking intensity,
measured on a three-point scale (never, occasionally, and frequently). We find that
more risk-tolerant people are more likely to smoke, both with and without country
fixed effects, and conditional on a large set of covariates. Appendix F.1 shows that
the correlations between risk preferences and labor market or health decisions are
not restricted to a particular set of countries. Rather, risk preferences are related to
risky behaviors in a qualitatively similar way around the world, although quantitative
magnitudes of the relationships do vary. For example risk taking is significantly
positively related to planned self-employment at least at the 10% level in about 90%
of countries in the sample.
5.3 Social Interactions
We analyze the relationships of the social preference measures to behaviors and
outcomes in the social domain.22 Table 7 summarizes the results. Columns (1)-(8)
show that altruism is significantly related to a broad range of prosocial behaviors
including donating, volunteering time, helping strangers, or sending money or goods
to other people in need. Across the different behavioral categories, the point estimate
is very consistent and implies that an increase in altruism by one standard deviation is
correlated with an increase in the probability of engaging in prosocial activities of 3.5–
6.5 percentage points, which corresponds to an increase of roughly 15–20% compared
to the respective baseline probabilities.23 Positive reciprocity is a significant correlate
of helping people in need (columns (5) through (8)), perhaps a manifestation of
generalized reciprocity in the sense that reciprocal people who have been helped
before are also willing to help others. In contrast, the negative reciprocity variable
is virtually uncorrelated with all of the prosocial activities in the first eight columns.
22Since trust constitutes a belief rather than a preference, we do not incorporate it in the
discussion here. However, all results are robust to controlling for trust.
23These baseline probabilities are 31.8%, 21.6%, 48.3%, and 23.7%, repectively (see Table 7 for
the order of variables).
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As columns (9) and (10) show, however, negative reciprocity is a significant predictor
of whether people are willing to voice their opinion to a public official.
Columns (11) through (14) examine the relationship between social preferences
and respondents’ family and friendship status. We find that more altruistic and more
positively reciprocal people are more likely to have friends they can count on when
in need, and that positive reciprocity correlates with being in a relationship.24
The overall pattern in Table 7 highlights that preferences are predictive of a
wide range of behaviors in the social domain and that the preference measures are of
sufficiently high quality to discriminate between different types of social behavior. As
Appendix F.1 shows, these relationships are not restricted to a small set of countries,
but instead hold for most countries separately. For instance, the correlation between
altruism and donating is statistically significant at the 5% level in 80% of all countries.
In sum, all of the GPS preference measures are significantly related to a broad
range of economic and social behaviors in a way one would intuitively expect. This
indicates that preference heterogeneity is important for understanding variation in
economic outcomes worldwide. In addition, the fact that the correlations are qualita-
tively similar across cultural backgrounds and development levels provides reassuring
evidence that the GPS survey items do indeed capture the relevant underlying pref-
erences even in a very heterogeneous sample in terms of cultural background and
economic development. In this sense, the correlations provide an important out-of-
context validation check for the survey module.
6 The Cultural Origins of Preference Variation
The previous analyses have documented a large amount of preference heterogeneity
both across and within countries. An immediate question is whether this variation
has deep cultural origins. While heterogeneity in different preferences may have
myriad of potentially different historical or cultural sources, we conclude the paper
by drilling deeper into the potential cultural origins of preference differences. We
focus on one particular proxy for cultural variation, i.e., linguistic features. Lan-
guage has been used as proxy for cultural variation in many previous studies (e.g.,
Fearon, 2003; Desmet et al., 2009, 2012; Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2015). In deriving
specific testable hypotheses on the relationship between preferences and linguistic or
cultural variation, we follow the work of Chen (2013) and investigate the relationship
between economic preferences and a structural feature of languages called future-time
reference (FTR). As discussed in detail by Chen (2013), languages differ in whether
24Also see Dohmen et al. (2009).
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or not they require people to grammatically mark future events: some languages
require people to explicitly distinguish between present and future by making use
of constructions such as “I will go to school tomorrow” (strong FTR), while others
allow speakers to talk about the future in present tense (weak FTR). Chen (2013)
argues that strong FTR languages may make the future feel more distant, potentially
resulting in less future-oriented behavior. In empirically testing this proposition, he
develops a binary FTR classification of languages and shows that – both across and
within countries – people who speak weak FTR languages save more, are less likely
to smoke, and have better health.25
Building on this insight, we investigate the relationship between preferences and
future-time reference. Our analysis serves two purposes. First, our patience measure
allows for a direct replication and extension of Chen’s results on future-oriented be-
havior. In particular, our patience measure arguably constitutes a more fundamental
and direct proxy for how people trade off current and future rewards than, e.g., med-
ical obesity. Second, our data allow for a systematic investigation of whether the
cultural trait captured by FTR is also related to other preferences rather than just
time preference. In particular, it is conceivable that people for whom the future
seems less distant are more likely to invest resources today to reap social benefits in
the future. Thus, traits that are related to cooperation, repeated interaction, and
reputation building should be more pronounced in weak FTR languages. Our data
on positive reciprocity, trust, and altruism provide natural candidates for such an
investigation. Our analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we investigate the relation-
ship between average preferences and FTR at the country level. Then, we exploit
within-country variation in preferences and FTR.
6.1 Cross-Country Evidence
To study the relationship between preferences and FTR, we employ Gallup’s inter-
view language as a proxy for the language respondents speak in their daily lives.26
We apply Chen’s classification of languages to our dataset, which results in a set of
55 coded languages. In addition, we were able to code an additional four languages
ourselves using the methodology outlined in Chen (2013).27 In sum, we have access
25Sutter et al. (2014) show that the same relationship exists for children in a bilingual city in
Italy.
26Correspondence with Gallup suggests that, naturally, in some countries interview language is
an imperfect proxy for the language people are most familiar with. Thus, proxying people’s daily
language with their interview language results in measurement error and hence attenuation bias,
which works against finding statistically significant effects in our analyses.
27These languages are: Fulfulde (weak FTR), Khmer (strong FTR), Moroccan Arabic (weak
FTR), and Dari (strong FTR). In addition, we changed one of Chen’s classifications after corre-
28
to 59 classified languages for a total of 75,224 respondents.28 All results are robust
to only making use of the languages coded by Chen.
After classifying each respondent, we compute the country-level fraction of people
whose language corresponds to weak as opposed to strong FTR. Then, we regress
average preferences in a given country on this fraction. To take into account that
we can classify only a subset of respondents in some countries (making the frac-
tion speaking weak FTR languages a less precise estimate of the true population
counterpart), our regressions weigh all observations by the fraction of people whose
language can be classified. Thus, countries in which we can classify a larger fraction
of respondents receive higher weight, as should be the case from a measurement error
perspective.29
Table 8 presents the results. For each preference, we report two specifications,
one without covariates and one with control variables commonly employed in cross-
country regressions, i.e., continent fixed effects, (log) per capita income, distance to
the equator, longitude, the fraction of the population that is at risk of contracting
malaria, and average precipitation. Results show that, across countries, weak FTR is
significantly correlated with average patience (columns (1)-(2)). As columns (5)-(6)
and (11)-(12) show, similar patterns obtain for positive reciprocity and trust. In con-
trast, altruism, risk taking, and negative reciprocity are not significantly correlated
with the fraction speaking weak FTR languages.
6.2 Within-Country Evidence
In a second step of the analysis, we exploit within-country variation in preferences
and FTR. Such analyses are arguably better suited to identify cultural origins of
preferences because they can account for unobserved heterogeneity at the country
level.
In many countries in our sample, we observe some variation in interview lan-
guages. However, variation in language does not necessarily mean variation in FTR.
In fact, only in Estonia, Nigeria, and Switzerland (2,925 respondents in total) do
interview languages vary across respondents such that we observe within-country
variation in FTR. Thus, we proceed by regressing individual-level preferences on a
dummy for whether a respondent speaks a weak or strong FTR language, conditional
sponding with him. He classified Persian as strong FTR, while it is in fact weak FTR. None of our
results depend on how we code Persian.
28We could not classify 23 languages, which are mostly spoken by small minorities (5,113 re-
spondents in total).
29Appendix G confirms that virtually identical results are obtained when running unweighted
OLS regressions, suggesting that measurement error in the fraction speaking weak FTR languages
is weak.
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on country fixed effects and age, age squared, gender, and our cognitive skills proxy.
Columns (1), (3), (5), (7), (9), and (11) of Table 9 present the results. Consistent
with the cross-country evidence, we find that individuals speaking weak FTR lan-
guages are more patient, more positively reciprocal, and more trusting. In addition,
these people are also significantly more altruistic.30 We do not find significant rela-
tionships between FTR and risk taking or negative reciprocity. For each preference,
a second column adds further controls, i.e., regional (state or province) fixed effects,
religion fixed effects, household income, health, and subjective institutional qual-
ity. Despite this comprehensive set of covariates, and only exploiting within-region
variation in FTR and preferences, we obtain almost identical results.
In sum, the results at the subnational level closely mirror those obtained in cross-
country analyses, the one exception being altruism.31 Thus, across levels of aggre-
gation, weak FTR is predictive of higher patience and higher levels of the prosocial
traits positive reciprocity, altruism, and trust. These results are supportive of the
hypothesis that cultural variation might coevolve with preferences. In particular,
just as in the case of the work by Chen (2013), our results lend themselves to two
interesting interpretations. First, speaking a weak FTR language may actually cause
patience and cooperation-enhancing prosociality; second, the historical evolution of
linguistic features and the formation preferences may both be a product of some other
very deep cultural trait. Regardless of the precise interpretation adopted, our results
highlight that the contemporary preference variation may have very deep historical
roots,32 and that the GPS data are well-suited to identify such effects.
7 Discussion, Applications, and Outlook
Many theories about human behavior in economics and other fields assume that a
fundamental set of preferences drives decision-making of individual agents. These in-
clude preferences about risk, timing of rewards, and in the social domain, reciprocity,
altruism, and trust. Despite their importance, empirical evidence on the extent and
nature of preference heterogeneity has been restricted to varying measures available
30When we restrict the sample to those countries with within-country variation in FTR and
regress the respective preference only on the FTR indicator as well as country fixed effects, the
resulting coefficient is always positive and statistically significat at the 10% level for patience and
at the 1% level for positive reciprocity, trust, and altruism. In Appendix G, we report the coefficient
on FTR separately for each country in which we observe within-country variation.
31Note that the correspondence between within- and across-country results is in no way me-
chanical, i.e., it need not necessarily be the case that individual- and country-level correlations are
aligned.
32As discussed by Chen (2013), variation in future-time reference is at least several hundred
years old.
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for a limited set of countries, and typically non-representative samples. This paper
has presented the first assessment of the distribution and nature of these fundamen-
tal traits on a globally representative basis using a novel dataset, which includes
behaviorally validated survey measures of preferences. The findings in this paper
are clearly only a first step towards tapping the potential of the GPS. The cross-
cultural dimension of the data and the representative sampling design allow entirely
new perspectives and levels of analysis. We illustrate this by discussing three broad
directions for future research: the mechanisms underlying the relationship between
preferences and individual characteristics, the deeper causes of cross-country varia-
tion in preferences, and the potential consequences of certain country-level preference
profiles.
First, the data vastly expand the amount of information available for under-
standing the relationship between individual-level characteristics and preferences.
The precise ways in which the strength and direction of preference differences vary
across different environments, locations, and institutions, may shed further light on
the mechanisms underlying preference differences. For example, if gender differences
in preferences are correlated within countries, this would suggest some deep mecha-
nisms that extend across preference domains.
Second, there is much more that can be done to investigate the ultimate origins
of the cross-country variation in preference. While our analysis of the relationship
between FTR and preferences has provided a first step in this direction, other cultural
proxies or historical events might likewise generate differences in preferences. For
example, other linguistic structures, such as politeness in pronoun usage (Helmbrecht,
2003), or the role of gender in the language might be related to preference differences
(Corbett, 1991). The correlation structure of preferences may also be informative
for understanding the ultimate sources of preference differences. Traits may also
coevolve, to the extent that they are complementary in contributing to evolutionary
fitness. In this regard, it is suggestive that the groupings of positively correlated
preferences that we find are plausibly complementary, in the context of theories about
the human ability to sustain cooperation (e.g., high patience and strong negative
reciprocity).
A third direction for future research is a detailed investigation of the link between
aggregate outcomes and preferences at the country level. Given the previous lack
of representative preference data, this is completely uncharted territory. Exploring
in detail the many ramifications of preference differences for explaining outcomes is
beyond the scope of this paper. However, to illustrate the potential power of the GPS
data in understanding cross-country variation in the economic and social domain,
33
we conclude with two examples. First, a tendency to retaliate could exacerbate
conflicts, so that negative reciprocity may be relevant for explaining the occurrence of
conflict or war. Second, a large body of dynamic theories of comparative development
and growth highlight the crucial role of time preference for aggregate accumulation
processes. Consistent with such theories, in a follow-up paper, Dohmen et al. (2015),
we find that patience is not only predictive of future-oriented decisions and income
at the individual level, but also across regions within countries, and even across
entire populations: more patient countries have higher savings rates, invest more
into education as well as into the stock of ideas and knowledge, grow faster, and are
wealthier.
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APPENDIX
A Global Preference Survey
A.1 Overview
The cross-country dataset measuring risk aversion, patience, positive and negative
reciprocity, altruism, and trust, was collected through the professional infrastructure
of the Gallup World Poll 2012. The data collection process consisted of three steps.
First, an experimental validation procedure was conducted to select the survey items.
Second, there was a pre-test of the selected survey items in a variety of countries to
ensure implementability in a culturally diverse sample. Third, the final data set was
collected through the regular professional data collection efforts in the framework of
the World Poll 2012.
A.2 Experimental Validation
To ensure the behavioral validity of the preference measures, all underlying survey
items were selected through an experimental validation procedure (see Falk et al.
(2015) for details). To this end, a sample of 409 German undergraduates completed
standard state-of-the-art financially incentivized laboratory experiments designed
to measure risk aversion, patience, positive and negative reciprocity, altruism, and
trust. The same sample of subjects then completed a large battery of potential survey
items. In a final step, for each preference, those survey items were selected which
jointly performed best in explaining the behavior under real incentives observed in
the choice experiments.
A.3 Pre-Test and Adjustment of Survey Items
Prior to including the preference module in the Gallup World Poll 2012, it was tested
in the field as part of the World Poll 2012 pre-test, which was conducted at the end
of 2011 in 22 countries. The main goal of the pre-test was to receive feedback on
each item from various cultural backgrounds in order to assess potential difficulties
in understanding and differences in the respondents’ interpretation of items. Based
on respondents’ feedback and suggestions, minor modifications were made to several
items before running the survey as part of the World Poll 2012.
The pre-test was run in 10 countries in central Asia (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Be-
larus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbek-
istan) 2 countries in South-East Asia (Bangladesh and Cambodia), 5 countries in
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Southern and Eastern Europe (Croatia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Turkey), 4
countries in the Middle East and North Africa (Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Saudi-
Arabia), and 1 country in Eastern Africa (Kenya). In each country, the sample size
was 10 to 15 people. Overall, more than 220 interviews were conducted. In most
countries, the sample was mixed in terms of gender, age, educational background,
and area of residence (urban / rural).
Participants in the pre-test were asked to state any difficulties in understanding
the items and to rephrase the meaning of items in their own words. If they encoun-
tered difficulties in understanding or interpreting items, respondents were asked to
make suggestions on how to modify the wording of the item in order to attain the
desired meaning.
Overall, the understanding of both the qualitative items and the quantitative
items was satisfactory. In particular, no interviewer received any complaints regard-
ing difficulties in assessing the quantitative questions or understanding the meaning
of the probability used in the hypothetical risky choice items. When asked about
rephrasing the qualitative items in their own words, most participants seemed to
have understood the items in exactly the way that was intended. Nevertheless, some
(sub-groups of) participants suggested adjustments to the wording of some items.
This resulted in minor changes to four items, relative to the “original” experimen-
tally validated items:
1. The use of the term “lottery” in hypothetical risky choices was troubling to
some Muslim participants. As a consequence, we dropped the term “lottery”
and replaced it with “draw”.
2. The term “charity” caused confusion in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, so it
was replaced it with “good cause”.
3. Some respondents asked for a clarification of the question asking about one’s
willingness to punish unfair behavior. This feedback lead to splitting the ques-
tion into two separate items, one item asking for one’s willingness to punish
unfair behavior towards others, and another asking for one’s willingness to
punish unfair behavior towards oneself.
4. When asked about hypothetical choices between monetary amounts today ver-
sus larger amounts one year later, some participants, especially in countries
with current or relatively recent phases of volatile and high inflation rates,
stated that their answer would depend on the rate of inflation, or said that
they would always take the immediate payment due to uncertainty with re-
spect to future inflation. Therefore, we decided to add the following phrase
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to each question involving hypothetical choices between immediate and future
monetary amounts: “Please assume there is no inflation, i.e., future prices are
the same as today’s prices.”
A.4 Selection of Countries
The goal when selecting countries was to ensure representative coverage of the global
population. Thus, countries from each continent and each region within continents
were chosen. Another goal was to maximize variation with respect to observables,
such as GDP per capita, language, historical and political characteristics, or geo-
graphical location and climatic conditions. Accordingly, the selection process favored
non-neighboring and culturally dissimilar countries. This procedure resulted in the
following sample of 76 countries:
East Asia and Pacific: Australia, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Japan, Philippines,
South Korea, Thailand, Vietnam
Europe and Central Asia: Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Czech Re-
public, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Kaza-
khstan, Lithuania, Moldova, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Ser-
bia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom
Latin America and Caribbean: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Guatemala, Haiti, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Suriname, Venezuela
Middle East and North Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Morocco,
Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates
North America: United States, Canada
South Asia: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka
Sub-Saharan Africa: Botswana, Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Rwanda,
South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zimbabwe
A.5 Sampling and Survey Implementation
A.5.1 Background
Since 2005, the international polling company Gallup has conducted an annual World
Poll, in which it surveys representative population samples in almost every country
around the world on, e.g., economic, social, political, and environmental issues. The
collection of our preference data was embedded into the regular World Poll 2012
and hence made use of the pre-existing polling infrastructure of one of the largest
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professional polling institutes in the world.33
Selecting Primary Sampling Units
In countries in which face-to-face interviews are conducted, the first stage of sam-
pling is the identification of primary sampling units (PSUs), consisting of clusters of
households. PSUs are stratified by population size and / or geography and clustering
is achieved through one or more stages of sampling. Where population information is
available, sample selection is based on probabilities proportional to population size.
If population information is not available, Gallup uses simple random sampling.
In countries in which telephone interviews are conducted, Gallup uses a random-
digit-dialing method or a nationally representative list of phone numbers. In coun-
tries with high mobile phone penetration, Gallup uses a dual sampling frame.
Selecting Households and Respondents
Gallup uses random route procedures to select sampled households. Unless an out-
right refusal to participate occurs, interviewers make up to three attempts to survey
the sampled household. To increase the probability of contact and completion, inter-
viewers make attempts at different times of the day, and when possible, on different
days. If the interviewer cannot obtain an interview at the initially sampled house-
hold, he or she uses a simple substitution method.
In face-to-face and telephone methodologies, random respondent selection is achieved
by using either the latest birthday or Kish grid methods.34 In a few Middle East and
Asian countries, gender-matched interviewing is required, and probability sampling
with quotas is implemented during the final stage of selection. Gallup implements
quality control procedures to validate the selection of correct samples and that the
correct person is randomly selected in each household.
33See http://www.gallup.com/strategicconsulting/156923/
worldwide-research-methodology.aspx
34The latest birthday method means that the person living in the household whose birthday
among all persons in the household was the most recent (and who is older than 15) is selected for
interviewing. With the Kish grid method, the interviewer selects the participants within a household
by using a table of random numbers. The interviewer will determine which random number to use
by looking at, e.g., how many households he or she has contacted so far (e.g., household no. 8) and
how many people live in the household (e.g., 3 people, aged 17, 34, and 36). For instance, if the
corresponding number in the table is 7, he or she will interview the person aged 17.
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Sampling Weights
Ex post, data weighting is used to ensure a nationally representative sample for each
country and is intended to be used for calculations within a country. These sampling
weights are provided by Gallup. First, base sampling weights are constructed to
account for geographic oversamples, household size, and other selection probabilities.
Second, post-stratification weights are constructed. Population statistics are used to
weight the data by gender, age, and, where reliable data are available, education or
socioeconomic status.
A.5.2 Translation of Items
The items of the preference module were translated into the major languages of
each target country. The translation process involved three steps. As a first step,
a translator suggested an English, Spanish or French version of a German item,
depending on the region. A second translator, being proficient in both the target
language and in English, French, or Spanish, then translated the item into the target
language. Finally, a third translator would review the item in the target language
and translate it back into the original language. If differences between the original
item and the back-translated item occurred, the process was adjusted and repeated
until all translators agreed on a final version.
A.5.3 Adjustment of Monetary Amounts in Quantitative Items
All items involving hypothetical monetary amounts were adjusted for each country
in terms of their real value. Monetary amounts were calculated to represent the same
share of a country’s median income in local currency as the share of the amount in
Euro of the German median income since the validation study had been conducted
in Germany. Monetary amounts used in the validation study with the German sam-
ple were “round” numbers to facilitate easy calculations (e.g., the expected return
of a lottery with equal chances of winning and losing) and to allow for easy com-
parisons (e.g., 100 Euro today versus 107.50 in 12 months). To proceed in a similar
way in all countries, monetary amounts were always rounded to the next “round”
number. For example, in the quantitative items involving choices between a lottery
and varying safe options, the value of the lottery was adjusted to a round number.
The varying safe options were then adjusted proportionally as in the original version.
While this necessarily resulted in some (very minor) variations in the real stake size
between countries, it minimized cross-country differences in the understanding the
quantitative items due to difficulties in assessing the involved monetary amounts.
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A.6 Wording of Survey Items
In the following, “willingness to act” indicates the following introduction: We now
ask for your willingness to act in a certain way in four different areas. Please again
indicate your answer on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means you are “completely
unwilling to do so” and a 10 means you are “very willing to do so”. You can also use
any numbers between 0 and 10 to indicate where you fall on the scale, like 0, 1, 2,
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10.
Similarly, “self-assessments” indicate that the respective statement was preceded
by the following introduction: How well do the following statements describe you as
a person? Please indicate your answer on a scale from 0 to 10. A 0 means “does not
describe me at all” and a 10 means “describes me perfectly”. You can also use any
numbers between 0 and 10 to indicate where you fall on the scale, like 0, 1, 2, 3, 4,
5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10.
A.6.1 Patience
1. (Sequence of five interdependent quantitative questions:) Suppose you were
given the choice between receiving a payment today or a payment in 12 months.
We will now present to you five situations. The payment today is the same
in each of these situations. The payment in 12 months is different in every
situation. For each of these situations we would like to know which you would
choose. Please assume there is no inflation, i.e, future prices are the same
as today’s prices. Please consider the following: Would you rather receive 100
Euro today or x Euro in 12 months?
The precise sequence of questions was given by the “tree” logic in Figure S5.
2. (Willingness to act:) How willing are you to give up something that is beneficial
for you today in order to benefit more from that in the future?
A.6.2 Risk Taking
1. (Similar to self-assessment:) Please tell me, in general, how willing or unwilling
you are to take risks. Please use a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means “completely
unwilling to take risks” and a 10 means you are “very willing to take risks”. You
can also use any numbers between 0 and 10 to indicate where you fall on the
scale, like 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10.
2. (Sequence of five interdependent quantitative questions:) Please imagine the
following situation. You can choose between a sure payment of a particular
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Figure 5: Tree for the staircase time task (numbers = payment in 12 months, A = choice of “100
euros today”, B = choice of “x euros in 12 months”. The staircase procedure worked as follows.
First, each respondent was asked whether they would prefer to receive 100 euros today or 154 euros
in 12 months from now (leftmost decision node). In case the respondent opted for the payment
today (“A”), in the second question the payment in 12 months was adjusted upwards to 185 euros.
If, on the other hand, the respondent chose the payment in 12 months, the corresponding payment
was adjusted down to 125 euros. Working further through the tree follows the same logic.
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amount of money, or a draw, where you would have an equal chance of getting
amount x or getting nothing. We will present to you five different situations.
What would you prefer: a draw with a 50 percent chance of receiving amount
x, and the same 50 percent chance of receiving nothing, or the amount of y as
a sure payment? The precise sequence of questions was given by the “tree”
logic in Figure S6.
A.6.3 Positive Reciprocity
1. (Self-assessment:) When someone does me a favor I am willing to return it.
2. (Hypothetical situation:) Please think about what you would do in the following
situation. You are in an area you are not familiar with, and you realize you
lost your way. You ask a stranger for directions. The stranger offers to take
you to your destination. Helping you costs the stranger about 20 Euro in total.
However, the stranger says he or she does not want any money from you.
You have six presents with you. The cheapest present costs 5 Euro, the most
expensive one costs 30 Euro. Do you give one of the presents to the stranger
as a “thank-you”-gift? If so, which present do you give to the stranger? No
present / The present worth 5 / 10 / 15 / 20 / 25 / 30 Euro.
A.6.4 Negative Reciprocity
1. (Self-assessment:) If I am treated very unjustly, I will take revenge at the first
occasion, even if there is a cost to do so.
2. (Willingness to act:) How willing are you to punish someone who treats you
unfairly, even if there may be costs for you?
3. (Willingness to act:) How willing are you to punish someone who treats others
unfairly, even if there may be costs for you?
A.6.5 Altruism
1. (Hypothetical situation:) Imagine the following situation: Today you unexpect-
edly received 1,000 Euro. How much of this amount would you donate to a good
cause? (Values between 0 and 1000 are allowed.)
2. (Willingness to act:) How willing are you to give to good causes without ex-
pecting anything in return?
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Figure 6: Tree for the staircase risk task (numbers = sure payment, A = choice of sure payment, B
= choice of lottery). The staircase procedure worked as follows. First, each respondent was asked
whether they would prefer to receive 160 euros for sure or whether they preferred a 50:50 chance
of receiving 300 euros or nothing. In case the respondent opted for the safe choice (“B”), the safe
amount of money being offered in the second question decreased to 80 euros. If, on the other hand,
the respondent opted for the gamble (“A”), the safe amount was increased to 240 euros. Working
further through the tree follows the same logic.
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A.6.6 Trust
(Self-assessment:) I assume that people have only the best intentions.
A.7 Computation of Preference Measures
A.7.1 Cleaning and Imputation of Missings
In order to efficiently use all available information in our data, missing survey items
were imputed based on the following procedure:
• If one (or more) survey items for a given preference were missing, then the
missing items were predicted using the responses to the available items. The
procedure was as follows:
– Suppose the preference was measured using two items, call them a and b.
For those observations with missing information on a, the procedure was
to predict its value based on the answer to b and its relationship to a,
which was estimated by regressing b on a for the sub-sample of subjects
who had nonmissing information on both, a and b (on the world sample).
– For the unfolding-brackets time and risk items, the imputation procedure
was similar, but made additional use of the informational content of the
responses of participants who started but did not finish the sequence of
the five questions. Again suppose that the preference is measured using
two items and suppose that a (the staircase measure) is missing. If the
respondent did not even start the staircase procedure, then imputation
was done using the methodology described above. On the other hand, if
the respondent answered between one and four of the staircase questions,
a was predicted using a different procedure. Suppose the respondent an-
swered four items such that his final staircase outcome would have to be
either x or y. A probit was run of the “x vs. y” decision on b, and the
corresponding coefficients were used to predict the decision for all miss-
ings (note that this constitutes a predicted probability). The expected
staircase outcome was then obtained by applying the predicted probabil-
ities to the respective staircase endpoints, i.e., in this case x and y. If the
respondent answered three (or less) questions, the same procedure was
applied, the only difference being that in this case the obtained predicted
probabilities were applied to the expected values of the staircase outcome
conditional on reaching the respective node. Put differently, the procedure
outlined above was applied recursively by working backwards through the
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“tree” logic of the staircase procedure, resulting in an expected value for
the outcome node.
– If all survey items for a given preference were missing, then no imputation
took place.
• Across the 12 survey items, between 0% and 8% of all responses had to be
imputed.
A.7.2 Computation of Preference Indices at the Individual Level
For each of the traits (risk preferences, time preferences, positive reciprocity, nega-
tive reciprocity, altruism, and trust), an individual-level index was computed that
aggregated responses across different survey items. Each of these indices was com-
puted by (i) computing the z-scores of each survey item at the individual level and
(ii) weighing these z-scores using the weights resulting from the experimental val-
idation procedure of Falk et al. (2015). Formally, these weights are given by the
coefficients of an OLS regression of observed behavior in the experimental validation
study on responses to the respective survey items, such that the weights sum to one.
In practice, for almost all preferences, the coefficients assign roughly equal weight to
all corresponding survey items. The weights are given by:
• Patience:
Patience = 0.7115185× Staircase time +0.2884815× Will. to give up sth. today
• Risk taking:
Risk taking = 0.4729985× Staircase risk + 0.5270015× Will. to take risks
• Positive reciprocity:
Pos. reciprocity = 0.4847038× Will. to return favor +0.5152962× Size of gift
• Negative reciprocity:
Neg. reciprocity = 0.5261938/2× Will. to punish if oneself treated unfairly
+ 0.5261938/2× Will. to punish if other treated unfairly
+ 0.3738062× Will. to take revenge
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As explained above, in the course of the pre-test, the negative reciprocity survey
item asking people for their willingness to punish others was split up into two
questions, one asking for the willingness to punish if oneself was treated unfairly
and one asking for the willingness to punish if someone was treated unfairly. In
order to apply the weighting procedure from the validation procedure to these
items, the weight of the original item was divided by two and these modified
weights were assigned to the new questions.
• Altruism:
Altruism = 0.5350048× Will. to give to good causes +0.4649952× Hypoth. donation
• Trust: The survey included only one corresponding item.
A.7.3 Computation of Country Averages
In order to compute country-level averages, individual-level data were weighted with
the sampling weights provided by Gallup, see Section S 1.5.1. These sampling weights
ensure that our measures correctly represent the population at the country level.
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A.8 Histograms by Preference
A.8.1 Individual Level
Figure 7: Distribution of preferences at individual level. The figure plots the distribution of stan-
dardized preference measures at the individual level. All data are standardized at the level of the
individual in the full sample.
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A.8.2 Country Level
Figure 8: Distribution of preferences at country level. The figure plots the distribution of country
averages of standardized preferences. All data are standardized at the level of the individual using
the full sample.
54
B Correlations Among Individual-Level Preferences
Table 10 reports the correlation structure among preferences at the individual level.
The correlations are computed conditional on country fixed effects to ensure that level
differences in preferences across countries do not spuriously generate the results. At
the same time, the correlation structure without country fixed effects is quantitatively
very similar and is available upon request.
Table 10: Partial correlations between preferences at individual level conditional on country fixed
effects
Patience Risk taking Pos. reciprocity Neg. reciprocity Altruism Trust
Patience 1
Risk taking 0.210∗∗∗ 1
Pos. reciprocity 0.084∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 1
Neg. reciprocity 0.112∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 1
Altruism 0.098∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 1
Trust 0.044∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 1
Notes. Pairwise partial correlations between preferences at individual level, conditional on country fixed effects.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
The next step in the analysis shows that the significant individual-level correla-
tions among preferences in the world sample are not driven by a few outlier countries
only. To this end, Table 11 shows the number of countries in which each pair of pref-
erences is significantly correlated at the 1% level. The results show that in most
cases the correlations are significant in a large fraction of the 76 countries.
Table 11: Number of countries in which preferences are significantly correlated
Patience Risk taking Pos. reciprocity Neg. reciprocity Altruism Trust
Patience
Risk taking 71
Pos. reciprocity 40 30
Neg. reciprocity 53 73 19
Altruism 47 50 76 32
Trust 21 24 54 37 62
Notes. Number of countries for which a given pair of preferences is significantly correlated at the 1% level.
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C Scatter Plots of Preferences by World Region
Western & Neo Europe
Former Communist Eastern Europe
Asia
Figure 9a: Risk, time, and social preferences by world region (1/2). Each subpanel (row) plots risk
taking, patience, negative reciprocity, and prosociality of all countries within a given world region.
The prosociality score is computed as the average of altruism, positive reciprocity, and trust.
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North Africa & Middle East
Sub-Saharan Africa
Southern Americas
Figure 9b: Risk, time, and social preferences by world region (2/2). Each subpanel (row) plots risk
taking, patience, negative reciprocity, and prosociality of all countries within a given world region.
The prosociality score is computed as the average of altruism, positive reciprocity, and trust.
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E Individual-Level Characteristics and Preferences
E.1 Age Profiles Separately by World Region
Figure 10: Age profiles separately by continent.
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E.2 Cognitive Ability and Preferences by Country
Figure 11: Cognitive ability correlations separately by country. Each panel plots the distribution
of cognitive ability correlations. That is, for each country, we regress the respective preference on
gender, age and its square, and subjective math skills, and plot the resulting math skill coefficients
as well as their significance level. In order to make countries comparable, each preference was
standardized (z-scores) within each country before computing the coefficients. Green dots indicate
countries in which the cognitive ability effect is not statistically different from zero at the 10% level,
while red / blue / pink dots denote countries in which the effect is significant at the 1% / 5% /
10% level, respectively. Positive coefficients imply that higher cognitive ability people have higher
values in the respective preference.
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F Individual-Level Behaviors
F.1 Distribution of Coefficients Across Countries
This section shows that the conditional correlations on the relationships between
preferences and individual-level behaviors that we reported on the global level in the
main text, are not due to a few outlier countries only. Instead, the results suggest
that our preference measures predict behavior across a broad set of countries. To
show this, we regress the behaviors discussed in Section 5 on the respective preference,
separately for each country, and then plot the distribution and statistical significance
of the resulting coefficients. For instance, the top left panel in Figure 12 shows that
the positive correlation between patience and savings holds in virtually all countries
in our sample.
While Figure 12 reports the results for patience and risktaking, Figure 13 visual-
izes the relationships between altruism and behaviors. Finally, Figure 14 presents the
correlations between positive and negative reciprocity and the behaviors discussed
in Section 5 of the main text.
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Figure 12: Correlations separately by country. Each panel plots the distribution of correlations
across countries. That is, for each country, we regress the respective outcome on a preference
and plot the resulting coefficients as well as their significance level. In order to make countries
comparable, each preference was standardized (z-scores) within each country before computing the
coefficients. Green dots indicate countries in which the correlation is not statistically different
from zero at the 10% level, while red / blue / pink dots denote countries in which the correlation
is significant at the 1% / 5% / 10% level, respectively. Positive coefficients imply that a higher
preference measure is related to a higher outcome measure.
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Figure 13: Correlations separately by country. Each panel plots the distribution of correlations
across countries. That is, for each country, we regress the respective outcome on a preference
and plot the resulting coefficients as well as their significance level. In order to make countries
comparable, each preference was standardized (z-scores) within each country before computing the
coefficients. Green dots indicate countries in which the correlation is not statistically different
from zero at the 10% level, while red / blue / pink dots denote countries in which the correlation
is significant at the 1% / 5% / 10% level, respectively. Positive coefficients imply that a higher
preference measure is related to a higher outcome measure.
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Figure 14: Correlations separately by country. Each panel plots the distribution of correlations
across countries. That is, for each country, we regress the respective outcome on a preference
and plot the resulting coefficients as well as their significance level. In order to make countries
comparable, each preference was standardized (z-scores) within each country before computing the
coefficients. Green dots indicate countries in which the correlation is not statistically different
from zero at the 10% level, while red / blue / pink dots denote countries in which the correlation
is significant at the 1% / 5% / 10% level, respectively. Positive coefficients imply that a higher
preference measure is related to a higher outcome measure.
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F.2 Robustness Checks
This appendix reports robustness checks on the relationship between preferences
and behaviors at the individual level. Specifically, while Section 5 of the main text
reported the results of OLS estimations, we now re-estimate all specifications using
probit or ordered probit regressions. As Tables 14 and 15 show, the results are
unchanged.
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G Details for Relationship Between Preferences and
FTR
G.1 Individual-Level Regressions Separately by Country
Table 16: Preferences and FTR: Within-country results
Country Weak FTR Strong FTR Patience Pos. reciprocity Trust Altruism
Estonia Estonian Russian 0.05 0.13∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗
Nigeria Yoruba English, Hausa, Igbo -0.08 0.54∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗ -0.11
Switzerland German French, Italian 0.17∗∗ 0.14∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗
OLS estimates, robust standard errors. The regressions report the coefficient on FTR in univariate
regressions for each country in which we observe within-country variation in FTR. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
G.2 Country-Level Regressions: Robustness
While the main text reported WLS estimates, Table 17 reports OLS estimates.
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H Discussion of Measurement Error and Within-
versus Between-Country Variation
In the presence of measurement error, a simple variance decomposition as shown
in Table 2 tends to overstate the relative importance of within-country variation in
preferences. This is because measurement error would be part of the within-country
variation, whereas the aggregation to country averages mitigates measurement er-
ror and thus removes this source of variation. This section provides evidence that
measurement error is unlikely to be large enough to drive the result.
To illustrate the impact of measurement error, recall that a simple regression of
an individual-level preference measure M on a matrix of country dummies D yields
M = D′γ + 
In a setting without measurement error  would be interpreted as individual specific
effects that are not explained by the variation between countries. The total variance
of M is given by
V ar(M) = V ar(δ) + V ar() + 2cov(δ, )
where δ = D′γ. Note that the R2 from a regression of M on the country dummies
(i.e., V ar(δ)/V ar(M)) could be interpreted as the between country-variation, i.e.,
the fraction of total variation explained by country dummies, if individual effects are
unrelated to country effects.
If, however, the preference measure M measures the true preference parameter
P with error, denoted e, the residual variation of the regression above does not only
capture individual effects. Assume that M is a linear function of P and e, i.e.,
M = P + e,
such that we can rewrite
P + e = δ + 
The total variance of the preference is hence
V ar(P ) = V ar(δ) + V ar()− V ar(e),
assuming that  ⊥ δ and e ⊥ , δ, P .
The regression model still allows identifying V ar(δ), but the share of prefer-
ence variation that is truly explained by the between-country variation is no longer
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given by the R2, V ar(δ)/V ar(M), but rather by V ar(δ)/V ar(P ). To assess whether
between-country or within-country effects explain a larger share of total variation,
one needs to compare V ar(δ)/V ar(P ) to V ar()/V ar(P ). Since V ar(P ) = V ar(M)−
V ar(e), V ar(e) needs to be determined.
The variance of measurement error, V ar(e), is not directly observable, but esti-
mates of test-retest correlations of relevant preference measures are available which
can be used to gauge the size of V ar(e). Based on arguments of plausibility, the
variance of the measurement error does not appear to be large enough to invalidate
the claim that the within-country variation is smaller than the between-country vari-
ation. Consider how large the proportion of measurement error in the total variation
ofM can be, with between-country effects still explaining a smaller share of variation
than individual-specific effects. Note that between- and within-country variation add
up to total variation in preferences absent measurement error: V ar(δ)/V ar(P ) =
1- V ar()/V ar(P ). Thus, between-country effects explain a relatively smaller share
of total variation if V ar(δ)/V ar(P ) < 0.50. Letting q with 0 < q ≤ 1 be the frac-
tion of measurement error in M , this condition can be evaluated by scaling up the
R2 from a regression of M on the set of country dummies by 1/(1 − q). I.e., if
V ar(δ)/(V ar(M)(1 − q)) < 0.5, the between-country variation is smaller than the
within-country variation, even accounting for measurement error.
Take, as an example, the estimate for risk-taking in Table 4, for which the re-
gression of the risk measure on the set of country dummies yields an R2 of 0.09.
Solving R2 < 0.5(1 − q) for q shows that as long as q < 0.828, the within coun-
try variation exceeds the between country variation. Previous work has shown that
the test-retest correlation of the single components of this particular risk measure is
around 0.6 (Beauchamp et al., 2011). This implies that, in order for measurement
error alone to be able to explain the greater variation of preferences within-country
than between-country, measurement error would have to be twice as large as existing
evidence suggests.
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I Description and Data Sources of Outcome Vari-
ables
I.1 Individual-Level Variables
Subjective law and order index. Included in Gallup’s Background data (0-1).
Derived from responses to three questions: “In the city or area where you live, do
you have confidence in the local police force?”; “Do you feel safe walking alone at
night in the city or area where you live?”; “Within the last 12 months, have you had
money or property stolen from you or another household member?”.
Subjective physical health index. Included in Gallup’s Background data (0-1).
Derived from responses to five questions: “Do you have any health problems that
prevent you from doing any of the things people your age normally can do?”; “Now,
please think about yesterday, from the morning until the end of the day. Think about
where you were, what you were doing, who you were with, and how you felt. Did you
feel well-rested yesterday?”; “Did you experience the following feelings during a lot
of the day yesterday? How about physical pain?”; “Did you experience the following
feelings during a lot of the day yesterday? How about worry?”; “Did you experience
the following feelings during a lot of the day yesterday? How about sadness?”.
Household income per capita. Included in Gallup’s background data. To calcu-
late income, respondents are asked to report their household income in local currency.
Those respondents who have difficulty answering the question are presented a set of
ranges in local currency and are asked which group they fall into. Income variables
are created by converting local currency to International Dollars (ID) using pur-
chasing power parity (PPP) ratios. Log household income is computed as log (1+
household income).
Education level. Included in Gallup’s background data. Level 1: Completed
elementary education or less (up to 8 years of basic education). Level 2: Secondary
- 3 year tertiary education and some education beyond secondary education (9-15
years of education). Level 3: Completed four years of education beyond high school
and / or received a 4-year college degree.
Subjective self-assessment of math skills. How well do the following state-
ments describe you as a person? Please indicate your answer on a scale from 0 to
10. A 0 means “does not describe me at all” and a 10 means “describes me perfectly”.
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You can also use any numbers between 0 and 10 to indicate where you fall on the
scale, like 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10. I am good at math.
Saved last year. Binary variable capturing whether the respondent saved any
money in the previous year. Included in Gallup’s background data.
Own business. Binary variable capturing whether the respondent is self-employed.
Included in Gallup’s background data.
Plan to start business. Binary variable capturing whether the respondent is
planning to start their own business (only asked of those who are not self-employed).
Included in Gallup’s background data.
Smoking intensity. Variable capturing how frequently a respondent smokes (0=never,
1=occasionally, 2=frequently). Included in Gallup’s background data.
Donated money. Binary variable capturing whether the respondent donated money
in the previous month. Included in Gallup’s background data.
Volunteered time. Binary variable capturing whether the respondent volunteered
time to an organization in the previous month. Included in Gallup’s background data.
Helped stranger. Binary variable capturing whether the respondent helped a
stranger who needed help in the previous month. Included in Gallup’s background
data.
Sent help to individual. Binary variable capturing whether the respondent sent
help (money or goods) to another individual in the previous year. Included in
Gallup’s background data.
Voiced opinion to official. Binary variable capturing whether the respondent
voiced their opinion to a public official in the previous month. Included in Gallup’s
background data.
Donated money. Binary variable capturing whether the respondent has relatives
or friends they can count on to help them whenever needed. Included in Gallup’s
background data.
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In a relationship. Binary variable coded as zero if the respondents is single,
separated, divorced, or widowed, and as 1 if respondent is married or has a domestic
partner. Included in Gallup’s background data.
I.2 Country-Level Variables
Distance to equator, longitude. Source: the CEPII geo database.
Land suitability for agriculture. Index of the suitability of land for agriculture
based on ecological indicators of climate suitability for cultivation, such as growing
degree days and the ratio of actual to potential evapotranspiration, as well as eco-
logical indicators of soil suitability for cultivation, such as soil carbon density and
soil pH, taken from Michalopoulos (2012).
Temperature. Average monthly temperature of a country in degree Celsius, 1961-
1990, taken from Ashraf and Galor (2013). Data originally based on geospatial
average monthly temperature data for this period reported by the G-ECON project
(Nordhaus, 2006).
Precipitation. Average monthly precipitation of a country in mm per month,
1961-1990, taken from Ashraf and Galor (2013). Data originally based on geospatial
average monthly precipitation data for this period reported by the G-ECON project
(Nordhaus, 2006).
Predicted genetic diversity. Predicted genetic diversity of the contemporary
population, adjusted for post-Columbian migration flows and genetic distance be-
tween ethnic groups. See Ashraf and Galor (2013).
GDP per capita. Average annual GDP per capita over the period 2003 – 2012,
in 2005US$. Source: World Bank Development Indicators.
Democracy index. Index that quanties the extent of institutionalized democracy,
as reported in the Polity IV dataset. Average from 2003 to 2012.
Percentage at risk of malaria. The percentage of population in regions of high
malaria risk (as of 1994), multiplied by the proportion of national cases involving
the fatal species of the malaria pathogen, P. falciparum. This variable was origi-
nally constructed by Gallup et al. (2000) and is part of Columbia University’s Earth
Institute data set on malaria. Data taken from Ashraf and Galor (2013).
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Percentage in (sub-)tropical zones. Percentage of area within a country which
forms part of each of the tropical or sub-tropical climatic zones. Data taken from
John Luke Gallup, http://www.pdx.edu/econ/jlgallup/country-geodata.
Life expectancy. Average life expectancy at birth, average from 2003 to 2012,
taken from World Bank Development Indicators.
Gini coefficient. Average from 2003 to 2012, taken fromWorld Bank Development
Indicators.
Redistribution (% of GDP). Government transfers as a fraction of national
income. Average from 2003 to 2012, taken from World Bank Development Indicators.
Ethnic and religious fractionalization. Indices due to Alesina et al. (2003)
capturing the probability that two randomly selected individuals from the same
country will be from different ethnic (religious) groups.
Linguistic diversity. Index due to Fearon (2003) capturing the linguistic diversity
within a given country, taking into account the structural similarity of languages
using a language tree.
Labor protection index. Index capturing the rigidity of employment laws by
Botero et al. (2004). Includes data on employment, collective relations, and social
security laws and measures legal worker protection.
Homicide rate. Numbers of intentional homicides per 100,000 people. Average
2003–2012, taken from World Bank Development Indicators.
Religion shares. Source: Barro (2003).
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